Linux/Unix 主机中安装的一个或多个程序包受到一个漏洞影响，而供应商没有提供补丁程序。

  - 已修复 Linux 内核中的下列漏洞：ntfs: Fix index_root heap OOB write in ntfs_ir_to_ib() ntfs_ir_to_ib copies all entries from index_root into a freshly allocated index_block_size-byte buffer without verifying that the entries fit in the available space. The entries in index_root may be larger than the usable entry space in the index block. This can cause OOB writes past the end of the allocation. The validator ntfs_index_root_inconsistent() checks that entries are self-consistent within the IR value, but never cross-checks them against index_block_size. There is no bounds check in ntfs_ir_to_ib() before the memcpy. Fixing this at the sink in ntfs_ir_to_ib() since ntfs_index_root_inconsistent() validates the logical consistency of index_root as a structure and a root with large entries is a structurally valid root. The bug is a size conflict of ntfs_ir_to_ib(). Also, the validator is called once per inode load in ntfs_read_locked_inode() while ntfs_ir_to_ib() is only called during a reparent, a check there adds no overhead to the common path. Moreover, even a future call path that bypasses the validator would still be protected. With NULL as first parameter of ntfs_error(), the volume error flag is never set by this call, so the device name will be absent from the error message. In any case, that the caller, ntfs_ir_reparent(), prints an error message that includes the device name on NULL returns. I think this is the best solution available without adding 'struct super_block *sb' as a parameter to ntfs_ir_to_ib(). This heap out-of-bounds write is triggered by a crafted filesystem image, which is not in the kernel threat model, anyway, fixing memory errors would be nice to keep things secure.
    (CVE-2026-90133)

请注意，Nessus 依赖供应商报告的程序包是否存在进行判断。

Linux/Unix 主機上安裝了一個或多個受到弱點影響的套件，且供應商未提供可用的修補程式。

  - 已解決 Linux 核心中的下列弱點：ntfs: Fix index_root heap OOB write in ntfs_ir_to_ib() ntfs_ir_to_ib copies all entries from index_root into a freshly allocated index_block_size-byte buffer without verifying that the entries fit in the available space. The entries in index_root may be larger than the usable entry space in the index block. This can cause OOB writes past the end of the allocation. The validator ntfs_index_root_inconsistent() checks that entries are self-consistent within the IR value, but never cross-checks them against index_block_size. There is no bounds check in ntfs_ir_to_ib() before the memcpy. Fixing this at the sink in ntfs_ir_to_ib() since ntfs_index_root_inconsistent() validates the logical consistency of index_root as a structure and a root with large entries is a structurally valid root. The bug is a size conflict of ntfs_ir_to_ib(). Also, the validator is called once per inode load in ntfs_read_locked_inode() while ntfs_ir_to_ib() is only called during a reparent, a check there adds no overhead to the common path. Moreover, even a future call path that bypasses the validator would still be protected. With NULL as first parameter of ntfs_error(), the volume error flag is never set by this call, so the device name will be absent from the error message. In any case, that the caller, ntfs_ir_reparent(), prints an error message that includes the device name on NULL returns. I think this is the best solution available without adding 'struct super_block *sb' as a parameter to ntfs_ir_to_ib(). This heap out-of-bounds write is triggered by a crafted filesystem image, which is not in the kernel threat model, anyway, fixing memory errors would be nice to keep things secure.
    (CVE-2026-90133)

請注意，Nessus 依賴供應商報告的套件存在。

Linux/Unix ホストには、ベンダーが提供するパッチが利用できない脆弱性の影響を受ける複数のパッケージがインストールされています。

  - Linux カーネルでは、以下の脆弱性が解決されています: ntfs: Fix index_root heap OOB write in ntfs_ir_to_ib() ntfs_ir_to_ib copies all entries from index_root into a freshly allocated index_block_size-byte buffer without verifying that the entries fit in the available space. The entries in index_root may be larger than the usable entry space in the index block. This can cause OOB writes past the end of the allocation. The validator ntfs_index_root_inconsistent() checks that entries are self-consistent within the IR value, but never cross-checks them against index_block_size. There is no bounds check in ntfs_ir_to_ib() before the memcpy. Fixing this at the sink in ntfs_ir_to_ib() since ntfs_index_root_inconsistent() validates the logical consistency of index_root as a structure and a root with large entries is a structurally valid root. The bug is a size conflict of ntfs_ir_to_ib(). Also, the validator is called once per inode load in ntfs_read_locked_inode() while ntfs_ir_to_ib() is only called during a reparent, a check there adds no overhead to the common path. Moreover, even a future call path that bypasses the validator would still be protected. With NULL as first parameter of ntfs_error(), the volume error flag is never set by this call, so the device name will be absent from the error message. In any case, that the caller, ntfs_ir_reparent(), prints an error message that includes the device name on NULL returns. I think this is the best solution available without adding 'struct super_block *sb' as a parameter to ntfs_ir_to_ib(). This heap out-of-bounds write is triggered by a crafted filesystem image, which is not in the kernel threat model, anyway, fixing memory errors would be nice to keep things secure.
    (CVE-2026-90133)

Nessus は、ベンダーによって報告されたパッケージの存在に依存していることに注意してください。

The Linux/Unix host has one or more packages installed that are impacted by a vulnerability without a vendor supplied patch available.

  - In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ntfs: Fix index_root heap OOB write in     ntfs_ir_to_ib() ntfs_ir_to_ib copies all entries from index_root into a freshly allocated     index_block_size-byte buffer without verifying that the entries fit in the available space. The entries in     index_root may be larger than the usable entry space in the index block. This can cause OOB writes past     the end of the allocation. The validator ntfs_index_root_inconsistent() checks that entries are self-     consistent within the IR value, but never cross-checks them against index_block_size. There is no bounds     check in ntfs_ir_to_ib() before the memcpy. Fixing this at the sink in ntfs_ir_to_ib() since     ntfs_index_root_inconsistent() validates the logical consistency of index_root as a structure and a root     with large entries is a structurally valid root. The bug is a size conflict of ntfs_ir_to_ib(). Also, the     validator is called once per inode load in ntfs_read_locked_inode() while ntfs_ir_to_ib() is only called     during a reparent, a check there adds no overhead to the common path. Moreover, even a future call path     that bypasses the validator would still be protected. With NULL as first parameter of ntfs_error(), the     volume error flag is never set by this call, so the device name will be absent from the error message. In     any case, that the caller, ntfs_ir_reparent(), prints an error message that includes the device name on     NULL returns. I think this is the best solution available without adding 'struct super_block *sb' as a     parameter to ntfs_ir_to_ib(). This heap out-of-bounds write is triggered by a crafted filesystem image,     which is not in the kernel threat model, anyway, fixing memory errors would be nice to keep things secure.
    (CVE-2026-90133)

Note that Nessus relies on the presence of the package as reported by the vendor.

ID	名稱	產品	系列	已發布	已更新	嚴重性
347776	Linux Distros 未修补的漏洞：CVE-2026-90133	Nessus	Misc.	2026/9/18	2026/11/11	high
347776	Linux Distros 未修補弱點：CVE-2026-90133	Nessus	Misc.	2026/9/18	2026/11/11	high
347776	Linux Distros のパッチ未適用の脆弱性: CVE-2026-90133	Nessus	Misc.	2026/9/18	2026/11/11	high
347776	Linux Distros Unpatched Vulnerability : CVE-2026-90133	Nessus	Misc.	2026/9/18	2026/11/11	high

偵測

搜尋 Plugin

high

high

high

high